Credits: Adil Sattarov, Unplash.com,
By: Sandra Arntz, Sjoerd Bakker, Samuel Ballin, Sophie van Dongen, Seema Murtuza and Martyna Stećko
This post is the first part of a two-part discussion on the impact of the latest Conference of Parties (COP) on climate change policy through the lens of human rights.
Introduction
On 22 November 2024, the 29th Conference of Parties (COP29) came to an end after two weeks of climate change conferences, events, and international negotiations during which the 198 states present discussed the actions to be undertaken for the proper implementation of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). As the UNFCCC’s supreme body, the Conference of Parties is required to annually assess global efforts and evaluate the progress yet to be made towards the achievement of the Convention’s main objective – action against climate change. In particular, the UNFCCC aims to prevent dangerous human induced climate change by stabilising greenhouse gas concentrations in a way that would allow ecosystems to adapt to averse environmental conditions and ensure food safety while enabling sustainable economic growth.
The COP’s outcomes are crucial to the global implementation of climate action, but their effects reach far beyond solely environmental law. Indeed, climate action evolves with its time and must be adapted to ever-changing worldwide needs and capabilities. Each year, scientists and lawyers across many fields, such as ourselves, scrutinise the COP’s conclusions to assess its impacts on biodiversity, the global economy, or human rights.
Last year’s COP28 was focused on reaching a formal agreement on the phasing-out or as was ultimately accepted, phasing-down of fossil fuels. This year’s COP29 shifted its attention to a different aspect of climate action – the pressing need for increased climate finance. The equitable collection and use of such a fund was thoroughly discussed in relation to several themes which will be explored in turn throughout both parts of this blog entry.
Part 1 will address the main demands and concerns of increased climate finance; updated commitments for the third round of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs); and the development of a framework for international carbon market trading. Part 2 will follow with discussions on the COP’s implications on gender equality; indigenous rights and the role of indigenous knowledge; and key outcomes and commitments. Part 1 and part 2 will both look at these topics through the lens of human rights.
Climate finance
Proposals for increasing climate finance have already been on the COP’s table for years. At COP29, it has finally become evident that without a significantly expanded fund, climate action as mandated by the UNFCCC will never be achieved, leading to critical consequences.
In 2009, developed countries initially agreed to raise $100 billion per year by 2020 to be dedicated to climate action in developing countries. In 2015, this deadline was, however, extended to 2025, with the $100bn goal finally being reached – and even exceeded – in 2022.
Now, two years later, it is estimated that the amount of finance necessary to ensure a timely and equitable climate action by 2035 totals $1.3 trillion. This sum is to be used towards climate adaption and mitigation, mostly through green energy transitions, in developing countries suffering major consequences of climate changes such as floods, landslides or droughts. Nevertheless, such adaptation and mitigation are not only necessary for the prevention of future natural disasters, but also to ensure the human rights of those populations currently most affected by climate change.
Indeed, the rights to ‘life, health, food, water and sanitation, education, development [and] an adequate standard of living’ are cited amongst the human rights most threatened by climate change. Although the reluctance to increase climate finance by some states might, to some degree, be attributed to the somewhat intangible or far-removed nature of the climate crisis, it is undeniable that such inaction has strong tangible repercussions on many human rights. $1.3 trillion is therefore not only the price of reducing GHG emissions. It is the sum necessary to ensure basic human rights of the people most affected and those of people which will be affected in the future.
The $1.3 trillion is not only to be collected from public funds but is also expected to flow from bilateral and multilateral development loans, targeted taxes or private investments. No one at the COP therefore expected that developed countries would commit to raise $1.3 trillion themselves. Nevertheless, the results of the American elections were the final blow to the developing countries’ hopes for a substantial increase to climate finance.
As Trump, once again, announced his will to withdraw the US from the Paris Agreement, it became clear that contributions towards climate action from the largest economy in the world were no longer secured. This consequential loss, coupled with rising economic pressures in developed countries led to negotiations starting at only $250 billion and ultimately being settled at $300 billion to be invested towards climate action in developing countries.
The gap of $1 trillion remains to be filled by the promised private investments yet to come and new levies and loans whose design and enforcement has not yet been addressed. In the meantime, developing countries are expected to keep negotiating financial deals and amounts to be invested by countries most responsible for climate change to protect them from it. Nonetheless, if COP29 has shown anything in that regard, it is that one cannot negotiate the amounts necessary to save lives, protect human rights and conserve ecosystems. Contributions to climate finance are not money spent on third countries but rather a necessary investment to protect the enjoyment of basic human rights for present and future generations. $300 billion is not yet enough.
Carbon Markets
Although climate finance and allocation of funds to developing nations has taken the centre stage at COP29, the conference has also been significant in reaching new agreements and fostering transparency on the carbon markets. In this regard, countries came together at COP29 to clarify how Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, more specifically Articles 6.2 and 6.4 could be operationalised.
Article 6.4 of the Paris Agreement
Carbon markets have long faced criticism regarding their reliability, with concerns that carbon removals being sold may not be genuine or verifiable. Article 6.4 of the Paris Agreement provides a framework for establishing an international public market where carbon credits can be freely traded under the supervision of the COP. The hope is that this supervision will lead to more ‘genuine’ carbon credits. Negotiations on this have been ongoing but slow—until the recent COP, which brought an unexpected shift.
On the first day of the conference, a surprising breakthrough occurred: two key documents were adopted. One outlines the methodology for certifying carbon removals, the other focuses on developing such methodologies. Examining the methodology for carbon removals reveals an interesting distinction in terminology, as outlined in previous IPCC reports (IPCC AR6 WGIII report, glossary) (IPCC AR-6 WG III report, technical summary). The adapted document states that carbon removals must be carefully monitored and reported to ensure their persistence over time.
Another key element is the calculation of the amount of removals eligible for trading. Though complex, the approach laid out in the adapted document can be summarized as follows: the net effect of a project on CO2 removals is calculated first. From this, emissions generated by the project and any leakages (unintended emissions elsewhere) are subtracted. A notable addition is the inclusion of a "crediting deficit." If the net calculation reveals a negative impact on the climate, this deficit must be accounted for in subsequent calculations, ensuring greater accountability and accuracy in carbon crediting.
With regard to human rights, the methodology document also contains a safeguard. It refers to an adopted sustainable development tool. Herein are a number of principles that projects should adhere to, including principle 4: human rights. The main idea reads as follows: ‘This principle states that the developer of the activity must respect international human rights to sustainable development, poverty reduction and fair distribution of development opportunities and benefits. Also, an activity should be conducted with due respect for human rights by avoiding infringing on the human rights of others and addressing adverse human rights impacts that the activity may cause or contribute to.’
This initial look into the methodology for carbon removals reveals a well-considered framework. However, caution is essential, and continuous scrutiny of the process remains critical.
Article 6.2 of the Paris Agreement
Besides Article 6.4 establishing an international carbon crediting mechanism setting up a global carbon market, Article 6.2 of the Paris Agreement enables the use of the so-called ‘internationally transferred mitigation options’ (ITMOs) system which allows country-to-country carbon trade in pursuit of achieving NDCs. While the rules on a centralised carbon market pursuant to Article 6.4 were already approved at the beginning of the COP, agreement on Article 6.2 was only reached in the final hours before the closing of the COP. This latter agreement is aimed at increasing transparency and preventing double counting of carbon credits when ex post revocations or revisions of authorisations are made. It also clarifies how countries can authorise the transfer of carbon credits and how registries tracking these transfers would operate.
Although the agreement on Article 6.2 is aimed at operationalising the mechanism set out under Art. 6.2, the decision is criticised for including weak and inconsistent rules on transparency and for including no safeguard to ensure the consistency between the claimed and actual carbon reductions. More concerning is the fact that there also seems to be no human rights safeguards requiring information on how the activity in question is in line with its human rights obligation.
Furthermore, preventing the authorisation of ITMOs if they violate human rights obligations is also not possible. Therefore, the decision on Art. 6.2 as it stands disregards the human rights implications of the fight against climate change and fails to impose obligations on countries to report on how they respect their human rights obligations while utilizing the internationally transferred mitigation outcomes mechanism under Art. 6.2.
Third rounds of NDCs
Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), a key outcome under Article 4.2 of the Paris Agreement, are action plans outlining the steps countries commit to take to achieve their global climate goals. NDCs must be updated every five years and the next round of NDCs are due in February 2025. While the Paris Agreement is concerned with combatting climate change by ensuring that temperature increase is limited to 1.5C, it also pays attention to the human rights implication of fighting climate change.
In this regard, the preamble of the Paris Agreement states that when undertaking climate action Parties should “respect, promote and consider their respective obligation on human rights.” Since the NDC is central to the Paris Agreement, human rights impacts and consideration should guide the development, and implementation of the NDCs. As such, information on how human rights are considered in the preparation and implementation of the NDC needs to be mainstreamed in the NDCs of all nations, which is currently not the case. This is owed to the fact that NDCs are set independently, and no methodology exists outlining what it needs to include.
A similar trend is evident in the NDCs announced by the United Kingdom, Brazil and UAE at the COP29. There, the United Kingdom presented the most ambitious goal of reducing all GHG emission by at least 81% compared to 1990 levels by 2035. Comparatively, Brazil, host of COP30, vowed to reduce emissions between 59% and 67% by 2035 against its 2005 baseline and, the UAE, host of COP 28, has committed to reduce emissions by 47% by 2035 against its 2019 baseline.
Although, all the NDCs submitted under the third round so far are more ambitious than their previous counterparts, details on the commitments are yet to be released, and as it stands now, no clear references to human rights are evident in either of them. As such, clear action plans outlining how to achieve these ambitions while respecting human rights obligations are necessary and welcomed from the three early movers as well from other countries of the international community. While we wait to see the updated NDCs released by all countries in 2025 to judge the extent to which it incorporates human rights, observations on the impact of climate change on gender and indigenous rights post COP 29 can already be made and will be discussed in Part 2 of this blogpost to be published separately at a later date.
You can read Part 2: here
Bio:
Sandra Arntz, PhD candidate at the department of Jurisprudence.
Sjoerd Bakker, PhD candidate at the department of Administrative Law.
Samuel Ballin, PhD candidate at the Centre for Migration Law.
Sophie van Dongen, PhD candidate at the department of Jurisprudence.
Seema Murtuza, PhD candidate at the department of International and European Law.
Martyna Stećko, PhD candidate at the department of International and European Law.